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The LankOvatOra-sQtra, a Mahayana text important for the study of YogA- 
cAra and Ch’an and Zen Buddhism, has been accessible to Western readers 
since D. T. Suzuki published his Studies in the Lankavatara Sutra (1930) 
and his translation of the Sanskrit text (1932). However, comparatively little 
has been published, at least in Western languages,1 since that time, probably 
due to the fact that it is a tremendously difficult text to tackle. First of all, as 
Sutton points out, there arc three extant Chinese translations (a fourth is 
lost), which are quite different from one another, and, of course, even the 
latest Chinese translation of the LahkOvatQra is earlier than the Nepalese 
manuscripts from which the Sanskrit text has been established. Furthermore, 
as everyone who has worked with the text has complained, the Lahktivatllra- 
sQtra is disorganized in structure; particularly problematic are the relation­
ships between the verse and prose portions of the main body of the sQtra, and 
between the main body and the tenth chapter (SagOthakam), which consists 
only of verses. Finally, the sQtra contains many important philosophical con­
cepts, but in a very unsystematic form. To deal with these satisfactorily, one 
would have to establish the history of each concept both up to and after its 
treatment in the text. Sutton’s project then, to produce what is probably the 
first book-length study of the LankOvatara-stitra in a Western language since 
Suzuki’s Studies, is very ambitious, and it is not surprising that the results are 
not completely successful. Before I express my reservations, I shall attempt to 
summarize his work.
1 For an extensive bibliography of mostly Japanese works, as well as of texts, transla­
tions, and commentaries, see Takasaki JikidO, RyOgakyO (Tokyo: DaitO Shuppan, 
1980), pp. 410-419.
In his study, Sutton examines a number of topics found in the sQtra, and he 
organizes his book by dividing these topics into two sections. The first section 
concerns ontology and consists of chapters on tathagatagarbha, the nature of 
the five skandhas, and dharmadhatu, which are characterized, respectively, as 
the Essence of Being, the Temporal Manifestation of Being, and the Spatial 
or Cosmic Dimension of Being. In the first chapter, Sutton discusses three 
aspects of the theory of tathagatagarbha, namely: as “Essence-of-Buddha- 
hood,” which he relates to Hindu concepts of titman, but which he main­
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tains is an updya for teaching those who are not ready to understand dhar- 
manairatmya; as “Embryo,” i.e., the potential for Buddhahood in all beings; 
and as “Womb,” which the Lahkavatara-sUtra identifies with dlayavijhUna 
(the sQtra’s original contribution to tathagatagarbha theory, as Sutton, follow­
ing Takasaki, points out). In the second chapter, the author compares the 
view of the five skandhas in the Lahkdvatara-stltra with those found in the 
Pili canon, in abhidharma texts (particularly Abhidharmakoda), and in 
Madhyamika literature, and he concludes that the abhidharma philosophers, 
along with YogdcAra thinkers such as Vasubandhu and Asaiiga, misunder­
stand the Buddha when they identify the skandhas with andtman, while the 
Lahkdvatura-sQtra, like the Madhyamikas, correctly understands the Bud­
dha’s Middle Way.
In the last chapter of the first section, Sutton discusses the relationship be­
tween dharmadhatu and a group of important concepts, including dharmata, 
tat hat d, and dUnyatd. He identifies one aspect of dharmadhatu as the “Cosmic 
Law,” which governs “the fundamental structure of the universe,” and 
stresses that the sQtra's interpretation shows that it does not completely deny 
the reality of the external world. Finally, he relates the three aspects of being 
that he has discussed so far to the classical YogScira trisvabhava theory 
found in the Madhydntavibhdga and concludes that tathagatagarbha cor­
responds to the “always non-existing” (asac ca nityam) nature of being, the 
five skandhas to the “though existing, yet not from the absolute point of view” 
(sac cdpy atattvatah) nature, and dharmadhatu to the “from the absolute 
point of view, existing and yet non-existing” (sadasattattvatah [svc] ca) nature.2 
I find it rather surprising that Sutton singles out tathagatagarbha as 
parikalpitasvabhava, even if it, as “specifically stated in the Sutra, is only a 
provisional concept and a teaching device, to be abandoned once the true 
meaning of AnStman has been obtained” (p. 130). Sutton throughout is con­
cerned to show that the LarikOvatara-sUtra is not guilty of positing an atman 
in the form of tathagatagarbha, but I would suspect that the characterization 
of tathagatagarbha as “always non-existing,” which is the YogScftra equiva­
2 Sutton’s reference here is confusing and misleading. In his text, he reproduces in 
full verse 3.3 of the MadhyBntavibhaga, but he does not translate it. Instead, he quotes 
a (rather awkward, I think) translation by Yamada Isshi of the corresponding portion 
of the BhOsya, but in his footnote (p. 340, n. 28) he refers to “the quote from the 
Madhyantavibhaga-bhOsya, 3, k.3 (R. C. Pandeya’s ed., p. 38) and its translation.” In 
fact, the passage quoted is from the kUrikOs, while the translation is from the BhUsya, 
and the page number in Pandeya’s edition is not 38, but 84. The Bhdsya, incidentally, 
uses the familiar terms parikalpita-, paratantra-, and parinispannasvabhdva to 
describe the three natures.
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lent of “absolutely false,’’ is, although possible, not typical. Sutton's argu­
ment would be more convincing if he provided an explicit reference concern­
ing this point.
The second section of Sutton’s book concerns YogAcara epistemology. The 
first chapter of this section is devoted mainly to Buddhist dialectics, especially 
in the form of the tetralemma (catu$koti)t and Sutton illustrates the way in 
which the sQtra encourages the elimination of dualistic thinking about topics 
such as existence, Buddhahood, and nirvana. In the second chapter, Sutton 
takes up the doctrine of mind-only (cittamdtra) and identifies three meanings 
of citta: the “empirical mind,” consisting of the caittadharmas; the 
“transformed Mind," i.e., the purified alayavijAana; and the “universal 
Mind, that is, the mind projected upon the world at large (tribhava, trai- 
dhatuka), when perceived to be the substitution for the triple world" (p. 
171). At the conclusion of this chapter, Sutton states, “The main thesis of this 
book is that the ‘Mind-only,’ or ‘Nothing but the Mind’ formula, should 
be regarded as a disparaging comment applicable to all absolutistic claims of 
explaining the ultimate Reality through conceptual language and not as a 
definitive affirmation of a one-sided and dogmatic monistic idealism A la 
Bishop Berkeley, as Suzuki and others erroneously believed" (pp. 203-204). 
His point throughout the chapter, if I understand him correctly, is that the 
famous statement from the DafabhQmika-stltra, “This whole world con­
sisting of the three spheres is nothing but mind,"3 and similar formulations 
throughout, at least, the earlier YogAcAra literature are epistemological rather 
than ontological: although they deny that the external world can be accurately 
cognized, they do not take a position regarding its existence or non-existence. 
Thus, Sutton follows what Lambert Schmithausen has described as “the 
mainly American fashion of altogether denying idealism (in the sense that ob­
jects, including material objects, are considered to be mere mental representa­
tions and—explicitly or implicitly—denied to exist outside mind)."4
3 Schmithausen’& translation of cittamatram idarp yad idam traidhatukarp (KondO’s 
edition, p. 98) as quoted on page 189.
4 Schmithausen, AlayavijAdna (Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist 
Studies, 1987), pp. 298-299.
The third chapter is about the nature and attainment of aryajnOna, which 
Sutton translates as “transcendental wisdom" or “gnosis," and which he 
equates with “No-mind" (acintyd), a state of “pure awareness." In the fourth 
chapter, Sutton, generally following Suzuki, briefly describes the YogAcAra 
system of eight vijAanas. He discusses the difference between vijAdna and 
jAdna (“empirical cognition" and “trans-empirical cognition") and between 
khydtivijndna and vastuprativikalpavijddna (“perceptual knowledge" and
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“object-discriminating knowledge”), and he very briefly explains the parOvrtti 
(“inner revolution”) of the Olayavijnana as understood by the LahkavatOra- 
sQtra. In his last chapter, on causation, Sutton seems primarily concerned 
with showing that the Yogftc&ra understanding of causality, at least as found 
in the sQtra, is essentially similar to that of Nagirjuna5 and that it does not 
reflect the “absolutely idealistic monism” described by Suzuki.
5 Apropos the relationship between Mfldhyamika and Yogacara interpretations of 
causation, the AbhidharmasamuccayabhOsya quotes a catuskoti in its explanation of 
the profundity of pratJtyasamutpgda: “Indeed it is also (said]: Because it has its own 
seed, (a dharma is not [produced] by another;/ Because of its dependence on those 
[conditions, it is] not [produced] by itself./ Because of the motionlessness [of itself and 
another, it is) not produced by the two./ And because of the efficacy of those [seeds 
and conditions, it is] not [produced] without cause” (svabljatvOn na paratah na 
svayarp tad apekjanOt/ niScestatvOn na ca dvObhyOm tacchakter nOpy ahetutah— 
ASBh:34). I have been unable to find the source of this passage, and I wonder whether 
the author of ASBh didn’t compose it himself.
6 Takasaki, “Sources of the Lankavfttara and its Position in Mahflyfina Buddhism,” 
in Indological and Buddhist Studies: Volume in Honour of Professor J. W. de Jong on 
his Sixtieth Birthday, edited by L. A. Hercus et al. (Canberra: Faculty of Asian 
Studies, 1982), pp. 545-568:560.
As this summary suggests, Sutton frequently uses the Lahkavatara-sQtra as 
the basis for his explication of various points of Yogflcftra philosophy. In do­
ing so he follows the lead of Suzuki, who in the second half of Studies in­
troduced what he considered to be the most important Yogficflra doctrines to a 
Western audience that was largely unfamiliar with the texts and thought of the 
school. However, more than sixty years have passed since the publication of 
Studies, Sutton’s remarkable statement that he knows of “only three book­
size studies of this school, and a handful of scholarly articles” (p. xv) to the 
contrary, a considerable amount of information about Yogficdra is available 
today; therefore, one can expect more sophisticated studies than in Suzuki’s 
time. It seems to me that a mainstream Yogacara Jdstra, such as the Trir^ikO 
with its Bhasya, would be a more logical basis than Lahkavatara-sQtra for “a 
study in the Ontology and Epistemology of the Yogacara School of Mahayana 
Buddhism” (the subtitle of Sutton’s book). As Takasaki has pointed out, 
“the Lahkavatara was in no way the first organiser of these (i.e., the major 
Yogacara] doctrines, nor was it composed by the orthodox Vijfianavadin or 
Yogacara teachers.”6 This is not to say that Sutton, who refers to Takasaki’s 
article, is unaware of the doctrinal differences between the Lahkavatara-sQtra 
and other Yogacara texts, but he frequently seems to be unsure of whether to 
focus on the peculiarities of the sQtra, of which detailed studies would be very 
valuable, or to try to derive systematic Yogacara doctrine from this strikingly
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unsystematic text.
A large proportion of Sutton’s work consists of translations of the many 
passages upon which he comments,7 and I have two criticisms related to the 
translations. It is true that Suzuki’s translation is outdated, and Sutton’s 
translation, on at least one occasion (p. 120), restores an important sentence 
that Suzuki seems to have omitted accidentally.8 However, Sutton’s is a 
philosophical study, and it is rather distracting to wade through line after line 
of translation from sQtra, which tends to be wordy and repetitive, in order to 
extract an important idea. The book would be more readable if it contained 
fewer translations of passages and more succinct paraphrases or summaries. 
Of course, a new English translation of the entire sQtra with textual notes 
would be a major and welcome contribution upon which future studies could 
be based.
7 In an appendix, Sutton thoughtfully provides the Sanskrit text for all passages that 
he translates, for which he is to be commended. It would be much more convenient if 
the text were placed either directly before or directly following the translation, but this 
is probably too much to ask of an editor who has to deal with the realities of book pro­
duction and marketing for a predominantly non-Sanskrit-reading audience.
’ “Now, on account of this, Mahftmati, I teach the one-pointed concentration” 
(atha etasmOn mahtonate ekayOnarn dedayami—Nanjto:14O). I assume that Suzuki’s 
omission is unintentional since he usually informs us when he emends the text and 
because all of the Chinese versions contain this sentence. The passage from which the 
sentence is dropped can he found on p. 122 of Suzuki’s translation. Incidentally, Sut­
ton does not remark on Suzuki’s omission, which he should have.
’ Suzuki, The Lankavatara Sutra: A Mahayana Text (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1932), pp. xlviii-xlix. Yasui KOsai has translated the Sanskrit text into Japanese 
(Bonbun Wayaku NyiJrybgakyO, Kyoto: HdzOkan, 1976).
10 Takasaki, RybgakyO (Tokyo: Daitd Shuppan, 1980).
Another problem with Sutton’s translations is his uncritical approach to his 
text. If one intends to study the LankOvatOra-sQtra, one must first decide 
which version to use and to what extent to refer to other versions. For exam­
ple, Suzuki translates from the Sanskrit, but he tells us that he follows the 
T’ang dynasty Chinese translation by Sik$£nanda, sometimes referred to as 
the seven-d&ffn version (T. 672) when he has difficulties,9 while Takasaki 
Jikido partially translates from and explains the Sung translation by 
Gunabhadra, known as the four-c/zuan version (T. 670).10
Sutton, who apparently does not know Chinese (p. 11), has decided to 
follow Suzuki in using the Sanskrit. He claims that in Nanjio’s text “all possi­
ble variants and corrections were carefully incorporated either into the text 
itself, or into the numerous footnotes” (p. 23), and he seems to feel that this 
absolves him of the responsibility of consulting other versions himself. His 
151
THE EASTERN BUDDHIST
faith in the infallibility of Nanjio's text is, however, unjustified, and his ex­
clusive reliance on the Sanskrit text results at least once in a translation that 
disagrees significantly with, and is obviously worse than, Suzuki's. In a discus­
sion of dependent origination, the Sanskrit text reads as follows: sad asato hi 
bhagavarps (TrthakaM apy utpattim varnayanti bhUtvO ca vinafarp pratyayair 
bhavanam (11:103). Sutton translates this as it stands: “On account of (the 
duality of) Being and non-Being, O Blessed One, the philosophers also explain 
the rising of (all) things through causal factors, and having come [into ex­
istence through causation], they also disappear (by causation)” (p. 269). 
Thus, according to Sutton's translation, this whole sentence describes a non­
Buddhist theory of causation.
The Chinese translations, on the other hand, read very differently: [Sung] 
(T. 670:493a); [Wei]
tfcWKo (T. 671:524a); [T’ang] t*
672:602c-603a). Suzuki suggests that there is an omission in the Sanskrit and 
translates “according to the Chinese translations”: “Blessed One, the 
philosophers explain birth from being and non-being, while according to the 
Blessed One, all things coming into existence from nothingness pass away by 
causation” (Suzuki 1932:90). According to Suzuki, then, the sentence jux­
taposes non-Buddhist and Buddhist theories.
In this case, the Sanskrit text does not make sense. Sutton is forced to sup­
ply many words in his attempt to translate it, an attempt that results in a 
sentence with peculiar English syntax. Suzuki is undoubtedly correct in his sur­
mise that a portion of the Sanskrit is missing and that the Chinese translations 
provide a better reading. His translation makes sense, but he does not indicate 
which Chinese version he used.11 Takasaki, translating from the Sung version 
but referring to the Sanskrit and to the Tibetan translation, also maintains 
that there is a lacuna in the Sanskrit. He furthermore identifies the missing por­
tion as corresponding to the portion in the Sung version that reads, “The 
Blessed One also says that things come into existence from nothingness”
11 Although, as I have mentioned, he states that he relies on the T’ang translation 
when he has trouble with the Sanskrit, Suzuki appears to have translated this passage 
on the basis of the Wei translation. The T’ang translation contains the phrase 
which is not found in the other versions or in Suzuki’s translation, ft £ is a translation 
of the Sanskrit kartr (creator), and I think that this phrase was inserted by £ik$dnanda 
in order to explain the non-Buddhist theory: they believe in “production from being” 
because they accept a creator (e.g., 16 vara) that exists permanently.
&W4=), and he shows that the phrase pratyayair bhOvanUm is not 
reflected in the Sung translation. Finally, he quotes from the Tibetan, which 
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probably provides the most accurate version of the Buddha’s understanding 
of dependent origination as expounded in the Lahkavatara-sQtra: “The Bless­
ed One says, moreover, that all existing things are produced from nothingness 
due to the various conditions, and having been produced, are once more 
destroyed.’*12 In Takasaki*s translation and annotations we can see most clear­
ly the intended distinction between the Buddha’s system of causality and those 
of the heretical schools, while the meaning of the passage is completely lost in 
Sutton’s translation.
12 bcom Idan ’das kyis kyah dhos po mams ma mchis pa las rkyen mams ’byun ba 
dan/ byuh nas kyah ’jig par gsuns te (Peking Bka’ *gyur, volume nu.-ff. 106a8-106bl; 
Takasaki 1980:343)
” Nakamura 1987:253-284.
14 Sutton does not include AlayavijilOna in his bibliography so 1 assume that it was 
not yet available when he wrote his book.
I have gone on at such length to show once again the danger of relying ex­
clusively on Sanskrit texts. Even though, as he says early in the book, he does 
not intend to supersede Suzuki’s translation, Sutton has provided translations 
of large portions of the text. Since his purpose is to investigate the Yogacar a 
ideas “as presented in one of the earliest and most influential texts, the 
Lahkavatara-sQtra” (p. 1), his translations should reflect some attempt to 
establish an accurate text, particularly in cases such as this. Even if he is 
unable to read Chinese or to consult Takasaki’s excellent work, he should at 
least acknowledge and take into account Suzuki’s textual footnotes.
I have already mentioned Sutton’s statement regarding the supposed dearth 
of materials on the Yogicara school. At the very least, he should have 
specified “in languages other than Japanese.’’ Even if one doesn’t read 
Japanese, one can get some idea of the wealth of scholarly studies on YogS- 
cSra topics by looking at Nakamura Hajime’s Indian Buddhism (through 
the 1970s)13 and at the list of works cited in Schmithausen’s Alayavijriana; 
together, these invaluable sources of bibliographical information contain 
hundreds of works. One might argue that much of the Japanese scholarship 
on Yogacara consists of very detailed studies of specific points of doctrine 
based on small passages of text. However, as Schmithausen has shown so con­
vincingly, there is no single, unified Yogdcara philosophy, and it is only with 
the help of this kind of detailed study that we can identify those ideas that are 
common to a group of texts and those that are unique to a particular text.14 As 
for the secondary literature specifically concerning the Lahkavatara-sQtra, I 
have cited above the bibliography in Takasaki’s ByOgakyO.
Finally, however, Sutton is to be commended for trying to make sense of 
this very difficult sQtra. In each of his chapters, he attempts to explain the
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meaning of an important concept, not merely what the text says about it. His 
insistence throughout the book that the purpose of the LahkOvatara-sQtra is 
practical rather than speculative is undoubtedly well founded, as is his sugges­
tion that the Yog&c&ra and M&dhyamika schools agree on more fundamental 
points than has usually been recognized. I hope that his work provokes a 
renewed interest among Western scholars in this important text.
Robert Kritzer
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